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Introduction
F
or more than 40 years, it has been well un-
derstood that, at least for economies at the
technological frontier such as the United
States, technological advances have been the most
important driver of economic growth. But technolog-
ical improvements by themselves do not contribute to
growth unless they are somehow commercialized,
whether in the form of new products and services,
or integrated as part of the production or service
delivery process.
Commercialization, in turn, can be accomplished
by existing firms or by new entrants. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the different matters, confirming
an insight of Joseph Schumpeter nearly a century ago:
Entrepreneurs, with little or no stake in the status
quo, seem to be responsible for a disproportionate
share of ‘‘radical’’ innovations (i.e., those that sub-
stantially disrupt the way things are currently done),
whereas large, existing firms seem to have a compar-
ative advantage in introducing more incremental in-
novations that refine what already exists. Both types
of innovation (radical and incremental) as well as
both types of firms (existing and new) are essential in
modern economies (Baumol, 1992; Baumol, Litan,
and Schramm, 2007).
The articles in this volume seek to advance our un-
derstanding of how technological advances are com-
mercialized. The first three do so in a developed
country context, primarily the United States; the
latter two examine this question in the Chinese con-
text. The comparison between United States and Chi-
na is deliberate. The United States is a frontier
economy; China is an up-and-coming challenger,
thought by many to be on the leading edge of change
in the 21st century. The contrasting experiences
should be useful to practitioners and researchers alike.
In the balance of this introductory chapter, we sum-
marize the main insights of each of the papers.
Summaries
All of the papers in this volume focus, in one way or
another, on a particular type of entrepreneurship—new
firms in which the business model is strongly rooted in
the development of application of a new technology.
However, such net technology ventures (NTVs) have a
limited survival rate. In the first article, Michael Song,
Ksenia Podoynitsyna, Hans van der Bij, and Johannes
I. M. Halman report a longitudinal study of 11,259
new technology ventures established between 1991 and
2000 in the United States. They find that of 11,259
NTVs, only 36 percent had more than five employees
and were still in operation four years after launch. By
the five-year mark, only 22 percent of the companies
had this level of employment and had survived.
The authors also report the results of their meta-
analysis of the academic literature to determine which
factors best account for NTV success. Specifically, the
authors reviewed 31 papers on this subject, drawing
out 24 success factors from them.
After correcting for various statistical issues, the
authors find that 8 of the 24 factors are most highly
correlated with NTV success, using Pearson rank
correlations: the ability to integrate supply chains,
market scope, firm age, age of founding team, financial
resources, founders’ marketing experience, founders’
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industry experience, and existence of patent protection.
Notably, the authors find from their analysis that a
number of popularly mentioned success factors are not
significantly associated with NTV success: founders’
experience in research and development, founders’ pri-
or start-up experience, various business environmental
variables, and the intensity of competition (or lack
thereof). For the remaining factors, the authors con-
ducted a moderator analysis and found that about half
of these were evenly split between being associated with
NTV success and this not being the case.
To be sure, there are limits to any meta-analysis,
which is only as good as the studies that make up the
analysis. Further, this particular study extends only
through 2000, or the year in which the Internet bubble
burst. Future studies will determine whether the
results reported in this article hold up.
One of the challenges confronting any business un-
dertaking a new venture is to cope with uncertainty
and thus the unknown. How much better off founders
of new companies and managers of existing ones
would be therefore if they could somehow anticipate
and react to the unknown factors that will influence
their success? In the second article, Christoph Loch,
Michael Solt, and Elaine Bailey lay out a process by
which firms can identify and ideally react to what the
authors call the ‘‘unknown unknowns’’ or ‘‘unfore-
seeable uncertainties.’’
The authors begin by drawing the traditional dis-
tinction between risk, which can be measured because
the probabilities of different possible outcomes are
known, and Knightian uncertainty, in which the prob-
abilities are not known. Yet even this definition of
uncertainty assumes that the relevant factors and vari-
ables that may affect an outcome, as well as the causal
relationships between them, are known. Those under-
taking a new venture, however, must confront even
greater uncertainty arising from an inability to recog-
nize or know the relevant variables and their relation-
ships to possible outcomes. The authors note that this
higher level of uncertainty has been given various
terms—unforeseen contingencies, wicked problems, or
unknown unknowns—and it is this difficult subject to
which they devote their attention.
Traditional models of project risk management—
which specify different outcomes and their probabil-
ities—do not account for the unknown unknowns,
which can be especially problematic when a new ven-
ture is attempting to develop or use radically new and
therefore untested technology. The authors outline
two possible ways that firms can account for the
unknown unknowns: The first is selectionism, or pur-
suing in parallel fashion multiple approaches to solv-
ing a problem and seeing what works and what does
not; this method is sometimes used by pharmaceutical
companies testing different molecules or, in the case
of new ventures, trying several different user interfac-
es or marketing messages. The second is probing and
learning, or learning and adjusting over time. Choos-
ing between these two approaches is a central chal-
lenge facing anyone undertaking a new venture, with
the outcome depending on the magnitude of the un-
foreseeable uncertainties and the complexity of the
initiative. The authors consider a range of alternatives
and their implications.
But how can those undertaking new ventures diag-
nose or determine the significance of the unknown
unknowns, especially when it may not be possible to
do so with any accuracy at the outset of a particular
project? The authors suggest that the reasonable
course is to break down the venture into various com-
ponents (e.g., technology, the market, the regulatory
environment) and to assess how each might be affect-
ed by unforeseeable uncertainty. They apply their ap-
proach to the experience of a Silicon Valley start-up,
Escend Technologies, in which the chief executive
officer (CEO) is one of the article’s coauthors, Bailey.
Escend was formed in 1999 with the aim of en-
abling semiconductor and electronic component man-
ufacturers to connect and collaborate with their sales
representatives, who sold these items to original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the electronics
business. Due to changing market conditions and cus-
tomer needs, Escend changed its business model sev-
eral times but, nonetheless, through its first four years
continued to lose money, despite having raised $16
million in venture funding. By 2003, the company was
clearly in need of a capital infusion, and Bailey was
brought on as an interim CEO while her venture cap-
ital firm decided whether to provide another round of
financing.
After investigating the company’s difficulties, Bai-
ley broke down the subproblems and identified some
immediate measures to save the company: among
them, reducing head count to slow the cash burn
rate. Bailey also mapped out the various uncertainties
or unknowns the company faced, including uncertain-
ty about what precisely customers most wanted,
which created uncertainty about the nature of the
appropriate technology. Key to this process of discovery
was to let the unknown unknowns emerge as measures
were taken to stabilize Escend’s finances. A plan for
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redirecting the company was developed out of this
probing and learning process, and another round of
financing from venture capitalists was secured.
The authors conclude their article with a detailed
analysis of how Bailey and her management team
identified various subproblems, with different types
and degrees of uncertainty, and developed subprojects
and solutions to address them. Throughout this pro-
cess of learning by doing, the team faced a series of
new uncertainties and challenges. In this respect, Esc-
end’s experience surely mirrors that of many, if not
most, start-ups and ongoing ventures.
Prior studies suggest that there are important differ-
ences between academic and corporate inventors,
particularly with respect to technology management.
In the third article, Bradley L. Golish, Mary E. Bester-
field-Sacre, and Larry J. Shuman examine different
technology development approaches taken by academ-
ic and corporate inventors in the United States.
The authors conducted a series of structured inter-
views with academic and corporate innovators to get
at this issue, asking each innovator to describe the
process map used to develop their particular technol-
ogy. These interviews uncovered several differences
between academic and corporate inventors.
First, academic inventors tend to focus primarily
on technological issues and to use significantly less
elements in their process maps than do their corporate
counterparts. Second, there is little commonality
among elements on the academic maps, suggesting
that academic inventors tend to do things differently
from one another. Third, corporate inventors tend to
pay more attention to financial issues than academic
inventors. Fourth, nearly 30 percent of the elements
on the corporate inventors’ maps are common, and
20 percent of all the elements on their maps are not
used by any of the academic inventors (and most of
these elements are nontechnical in nature).
The authors conclude that academic inventors tend
to ignore financial or market considerations in their
activities. For this reason, universities that employ
academic inventors would be better positioned to ben-
efit from patents if these inventors paid more atten-
tion to customer demands and needs.
Whereas as the first three articles in the volume
largely concentrate on technology commercialization
in the United States, the last two articles focus on this
activity in the world’s most dynamic economy, China.
Yuan Li, Hai Guo, Yi Liu, and Mingfang Li focus
on entrepreneurial orientation (EO) of Chinese firms
and its relationship to the commercialization of
technology in China. The authors note that prior
studies of EO have concentrated on its role in devel-
oped economies. Their study, in contrast, takes the
analysis to the world’s largest developing economy,
where formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have
been partially privatized, in large measure by enabling
CEOs and other managers to own some portion of the
equity of the enterprises. The authors use a data base of
approximately 600 Chinese firms to test two key hy-
potheses: (1) whether and how organizational incen-
tives—especially CEO ownership and CEO turnover—
affect the EO of the Chinese firms; and (2) whether EO
in turn in any way is related to the propensity of firms
to commercialize new technologies.
In theory, there is reason to believe that there is
a positive connection between CEO ownership and a
firm’s propensity to take risks—that is, to be entrepre-
neurial. Ownership aligns the personal incentives of the
CEO with the performance of the firm. Since the CEO
stands to gain from risk taking by the firm, other things
being equal, firms in which CEOs own a significant
share of the capital should therefore be entrepreneurial
than those where the CEO is simply a manager.
The connection between CEO turnover and a
firm’s EO, at least at the theoretical level, is more
ambiguous. Agency theory might suggest that short-
term CEO tenure would dampen the firm’s propensity
to be entrepreneurial, since CEOs expecting to turn
over quickly could be tempted to engage in more
self-centered and short-term behavior. On the other
hand, CEOs who move from job to job are more likely
to learn from competitors, and this should enhance
their propensity to take prudent risks. The authors
posit a third possibility: that there is an inverse
U relationship between CEO turnover frequency
and firm EO. The thought here is that low and high
turnover may be inimical to entrepreneurship but
that at some middle level of turnover frequency CEOs
are at a happy medium, where they are sufficiently
comfortable with their firm and knowledge of its chal-
lenges that they can take prudent risks but not serving
such a long term that they will have lost the desire to
take risks.
The authors make out a more straightforward case,
again in theory, for a positive link between a firm’s
EO and its propensity to be involved in the commer-
cialization of new technologies. Further, they argue
from first principles that as technology in a particular
sector changes more rapidly—in other words, as tech-
nological turbulence increases—the more interested
firms should be commercializing new technologies.
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If this were not true, then the firm’s continued exis-
tence would be put in doubt.
The authors’ database used to test these various
hypotheses contains firms from seven Chinese prov-
inces and the municipality of Shanghai. The data
cover the 1997–2001 time period, or the time frame
in which significant reforms of management incentives
were implemented as part of the Ninth Five Year De-
velopment Plan in China. The authors measured CEO
ownership by the fraction of a firm’s shares that were
owned by the CEO; CEO turnover by the number of
CEO replacements during the five year period; entre-
preneurial orientation based on a seven-point scale
determined by the firm’s emphasis on research and
development (R&D), tendency to undertake high-
risk, high-return projects, and four other factors; tech-
nological turbulence by four factors related to the
pace of technological change in a sector; and technol-
ogy commercialization by a seven-point scale based
on a number of items, including numbers of patents
and the extent to which the technologies underlying
them are developed into products.
The results of the authors’ analysis broadly con-
firmed their hypotheses. There is, in fact, a positive
relationship between both CEO ownership the entre-
preneurial orientation of the firms in their sample.
The data also confirm the presence of the hypothe-
sized inverse U relationship between the frequency of
CEO turnover and EO. And there is, indeed, as one
might expect, a positive relationship between a firm’s
EO and its propensity to engage in the commercial-
ization of new technologies.
The Chinese economy is being rapidly transformed
not only by the partial privatization of the former
SOEs but also by the proliferation of new, smaller
firms. Wai-sum Siu and Qiong Bao examine in the
final article the network strategies of small Chinese
high-technology firms.
The importance of networking by entrepreneurs,
with other entrepreneurs and sources of capital, is
widely recognized. China is no exception, although
there appears to be debate about the relevant trends.
Some contend that business actors are paying more
attention to more objective considerations as price
and quality of products than to social relationships
they may have. Others have a different view, namely
that interpersonal relationships continue to have an
important impact on the way business is conducted.
To help resolve this debate, Siu and Bao report
findings from multiple case studies, from 12 entrepre-
neurial firms at three different (but early) points in
their life cycles. The cases were developed largely
through extensive interviews and were selected
through the authors’ personal network of high-
technology firms in two of the most technologically
dynamic parts of China, Beijing and Shenzen. The
authors defend their choice of the two geographic ar-
eas in several ways, noting that of the roughly 22,000
high-technology firms in China, about 15,000 are
located in Beijing. Shenzen was added to the analysis
because of its role as the first special economic zone,
its strong economic development track record, and its
relatively open political environment. Both areas of
the country attract many people from other parts of
China to establish new business ventures.
The interviews revealed two different types of net-
works: (1) those that are based on collaboration
between the parties to advance a common end; and
(2) those based on transactions, where one party typ-
ically seeks to piggyback on the economic power of
the other. Clearly, the transaction networks are weak-
er than the collaboration networks. Entrepreneurs
may choose one or the other type of network but of-
ten will use both types, depending on the need. For
example, in designing new products, a product-based
entrepreneur would want close collaboration with its
suppliers, designers, and manufacturers. But in the
actual purchasing of suppliers, the same entrepreneur
may find a useful transaction-based partner. Or the
product entrepreneur may seek shorter-term transac-
tion-based relationships with particular design houses
so as not to become overly dependent on a single one.
Not surprisingly, personal trust plays an important
role in all networks. One entrepreneur pointed to his
relationships with other university alumni (a consid-
eration present in developed economies as well). Some
networks develop so that the parties become inter-
dependent—that is, the relationship becomes essential
for both (or more) parties to survive. Networks and
relationships can and often do change as firms evolve;
firms also find themselves entering or forming new
networks as conditions warrant. The authors provide
numerous examples that demonstrate these findings.
Collectively, the articles in this volume advance our
understanding of the forces driving firms to commer-
cialize new technologies and the factors that drive
their success. In addition, the articles on China pro-
vide a much closer look than has heretofore been
available at the factors influencing the success and
nature of operations of both large, former SOEs and
the new technologically oriented firms springing up all
over China.
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Certain conclusions from the articles on China
should resonate with researchers and entrepreneurs
in developed economies. Ownership of firms by their
leaders makes a difference to firm performance in
China, as one would expect it to in more developed
settings. Moreover, the networks of the founders of
new ventures in China are found to be similar to those
present in the developed economies.
In short, though entrepreneurs in different parts of
the world must shape their businesses to adapt to local
laws, mores, and cultures, the forces driving their
success—ownership and networking—may be com-
mon to successful entrepreneurial behavior through-
out the world.
References
Baumol, William J. (1992). The Free Market Innovation Machine.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Baumol, William J., Litan, Robert E., and Schramm, Carl (2007). Good
Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Pros-
perity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
6 J PROD INNOV MANAG
2008;25:2–6
R.E. LITAN AND M. SONG
